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Malicious anchor nodes will constantly hinder genuine and appropriate localization. Discovering the mali-
cious or vulnerable anchor node is an essential problem in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). In wireless 
sensor networks, anchor nodes are the nodes that know its current location. Neighbouring nodes or non-
anchor nodes calculate its location (or its location reference) with the help of anchor nodes. Ingenuous 
localization is not possible in the presence of a cheating anchor node or a cheating node. Nowadays, it’s a 
challenging task to identify the cheating anchor node or cheating node in a network. Even after finding out 
the location of the cheating anchor node, there is no assurance, that the identified node is legitimate or not. 
This paper aims to localize the cheating anchor nodes using trilateration algorithm and later associate it with 
maximum likelihood expectation technique (MLE), and Mahalanobis distance to obtain maximum accuracy 
in identifying malicious or cheating anchor nodes during localization. We were able to attain a considerable 
reduction in the error achieved during localization. For implementation purpose we simulated our scheme 
using ns-3 network simulator. 
 
Keywords : Anchor Node, Distance-based Localization, Mahalanobis Distance, Maximum Likelihood 
Expectation, Security, Trilateration, Wireless Sensor Networks. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless Adhoc and sensor networks are on 
a steady rise in the recent decade. This is 
because of their reduced cost in deployment 
and maintenance. Advancements in radio fre-
quency spectrum also carved way for the im-
provement in the data rate for communica-
tion. Many devices belong to wireless ad hoc 
and sensor networks; one among them is an-
chor node [1-8]. Anchor nodes are the nodes 
that know its current location. Neighbouring 
nodes or non-anchor nodes calculate its loca-
tion (or location reference) with the help of 
an-chor nodes, and its working is quite 
referable to Light House. 
 
 
The location of the nodes plays a significant 
role in many areas as routing, surveillance and 
monitoring, military etc. The sensor nodes must 
know their location reference to carry-out 
location-based routing (LR) [9-12]. To find out 
the shortest route, the location aided routing 
(LAR) [13-15] makes use of the locality refer-
ence of the sensor nodes. In some industries 
the sensor nodes are used to identify minute 
changes as pressure, temperature and gas 
leak, and in military, robots are used to detect 
land-mine where in both the cases location 
informa-tion plays a key part. 
 
Anchor nodes can also be used to find the cur-
rent location of any device (mobile phones, ob- 
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jects and people). It does that by transmitting 
anchor frames periodically or at regular inter-
vals. Usually anchor frames are used to adver-
tise the occurrence of a wireless modem or an 
Access Point (AP). Each anchor frame carries 
some details about the configuration of AP and 
a little security information for the clients. 
 
When the technologies are on a massive up-
swing, the need for security of the relevant 
technologies arises. There can be several oc-
casion where the anchor nodes can be vulner-
able to security breach. Because of the se-
curity breach the anchor node starts cheating 
by providing false information. In the pres-ence 
of cheating anchor nodes the chances of 
localization drastically decreases. Many pa-pers 
[16-19] discuss about the localization of 
cheating anchor nodes, but with inconsistent 
accuracy. So, to overcome this, we localize the 
cheating or vulnerable anchor node using tri-
lateration technique, and associate the results 
with maximum likelihood expectation tech-nique 
[20-33] and Mahalanobis distance [34]. No such 
scheme has been used till now to iden-tify the 
malicious anchor nodes. 
 
Organization of the paper: Section 2 pro-vides 
the localization using trilateration algo-rithm 
and Section 3 and Section 4 studies the 
maximum likelihood expectation and Maha-
lanobis distance, respectively. Simulation and 
results are covered in Section 5, Section 6 
expli-cates few future events and Section 7 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. LOCALIZATION USING TRILAT-
ERATION ALGORITHM  
 
Anchor nodes are widely used for tacking and 
localization; whereas now-a-days it is also used 
for navigation and route-identification. With the 
help of anchor nodes, a user can find out his 
current location. Consider a scenario like a hotel 
or museum, there may be many occasions where 
people go out of track. This can be flab-bergasted 
by installing anchor nodes installed in various 
locations, so that people can trace out there 
location very easily and it is possi- 
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ble only when the anchor nodes are authen-tic. 
Now-a-days hackers are on a rise; anybody 
can easily get into any system and change its 
settings. Similarly, they can hack any anchor 
nodes and change its location reference to 
some other false location reference, making 
people lose their track; thus leading to a bad 
imprint about the system (i.e., hotel, museum). 
 
An attack is exemplified in Figure 1 and Figure 
2. Figure 1 shows the initial deployment of an-
chor nodes A1, A2, A3; with location reference  
(x1, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y3); and distance L1, L2, 
L3; respectively, from the trilateration point  
T, having location reference (xt, yt). Figure 2 
demonstrates the logical deployment of anchor 
nodes after the attack i.e., multiple changes in 
location reference of anchor node A2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Initial Set-up of Anchor Nodes. 
 
 
The three dimensional location coordinate of 
any device or node can be estimated using tri-
lateration calculations. Trilateration technique 
uses distance measurements rather than angu-
lar measurements; latter technique is also used 
in many localization techniques [21-23]. Us-ing 
some iterative schemes like least square, least 
median square [17], least trimmed square [24] 
and gradient descent [25], can equitably in-
crease the accuracy of trilateration technique. 
 
Trilateration techniques use the distance mea-
surement between the nodes to calculate the 
location reference. The distances between 
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Figure 2. Initial Set-up of Anchor Nodes. 
 
the nodes are identified using Received Sig-nal 
Strength (RSSI) [26, 33] or Time of Ar-rival (ToA) 
[27, 28, 33] or Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA) 
[29, 30, 33]. When a node (re-questing node) 
wants to identify its location in-formation using 
trilateration technique, it does with the help of 
three or more neighbouring anchor nodes. The 
exemplification of trilater-ation techniques is as 
follows: 
 
1. A node that wants to find its location ref-
erence (or location coordinate) sends a lo-
calization request to any of its neighbour-
ing anchor nodes. The anchor node sends a 
reply with its current location reference 
and its RSSI measurement with respect to 
the node that wants to localize. Based on 
this information, we put up a virtual 
wireless ring (VWR) (or logical ring) [31] as 
shown in Figure 3. The assumption of the 
logical ring is made with the an-chor node 
as centre. The requesting node can be 
located anywhere on the circum-ference of 
the logical ring, and thus mak-ing it difficult 
to guess its exact location.  
 
 
2. Next the same requesting node sends another 
localization request to a differ-  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Virtual wireless ring with one anchor 
node. 
 
ent neighbouring anchor node. The an-chor 
node follows the same process as 
discussed in the previous step. Again 
another logical ring is updated to the pre-
vious one, shown in Figure 4. From the 
logical observation we can analyse that the 
location of the requesting node could be 
present in any one of the intersecting point 
of the two logical rings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Virtual Wireless Ring with Two An-chor 
Nodes. 
 
3. Finally to ease the muddle, the same re-
questing node sends another localization 
request to a different neighbouring an-chor 
node other than the previous two anchor 
nodes. The same process is re-peated with 
the new neighbouring anchor node. When 
the final virtual wireless ring is drawn, we 
would be able to extract the exact location 
of the requesting node. Figure 5 shows the 
localization of a node using trilateration 
technique.  
 
The three dimensional location coordinate of any 
device or node can be estimated using tri-lateration 
calculations. Trilateration technique 
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Figure 5. Virtual Wireless Ring with Three Anchor 
Node. 
 
 
 
uses distance measurements rather than angu-lar 
measurements; the latter technique is also used 
in many localization techniques. Using some 
iterative schemes like least square, least median 
square, least trimmed square and gra-dient 
descent, can equitably increase the accu-racy of 
trilateration technique. 
 
Trilateration techniques use the distance mea-
surement between the nodes to calculate the 
location reference. The distances between the 
nodes are identified using Received Signal 
Strength (RSSI) or Time of Arrival (ToA) or Time 
Difference of Arrival (TDoA). When a node 
(requesting node) wants to identify its location 
information using trilateration tech-nique, it does 
with the help of three or more neighbouring 
anchor nodes. 
 
The mathematical computation of trilateration is 
as follows: 
Consider three circles or spheres with centre 
C1, C2 and C3, radius L1, L2 and L3 from points A1, A2 and A3 
(anchor node location), 
refer Figure 6. 
The general equation of the sphere is 
 
3 
X 
(Ak − Ck)
2 = L2  
k=1 
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Figure 6. Trilateration Measurements.  
This can be modified as follows,  
 
L2 =  A2 + A2 + A2 (1) 
 
1  1 2 3  
 
L2
2 =  (A1 − D)2 + A22 + A32 (2) 
 
L3
2 =  (A1 − i)2 + (A2 − j)2 + A32 (3) 
 
Subtracting Eq. (2) from Eq. (1), we get  
 
L2
2 − L1
2 =     
 
(A1 − D)
2 + A2
2 + A3
2 − A1
2 − A2
2 − A3
2 (4) 
 
Substituting we get,  
 
  L2 − L
2 + D2  
 
A1 = 
1 2  
(5) 
 
 2D    
      
  
From the first two circles we can find out that 
the two circles intersect at two different points, 
that is  
D − A1 < A2 < D + A1 (6) 
Substituting Eq. (5) in Eq.(1), we can procure  
  
 
L1
2 − L2
2 + D2 
 
2   
 
2  2 2  
 
L1 = 
 
+ A2 + A3 (7) 
 
2D 
  
Substituting we get the solution of the inter-
section of two circles 
2 2   2  (L1
2 − L2
2 + D2)2 
(8)  A + A = L 
1 − 
  
  
2 3   
4D2 
 
 
       
 
Substituting Eq. (1) with Eqs. (3) and (8), we get  
s =  L21 − A
2
1 − A
2
2  
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L3
2   =  (A1 − i)
2 + (A2 − j)
2 + s (9)  
  L2 − L2 − A2 + (A2 − i)2 + j2 
 
A2 = 
1 2 1 1  
 
    2j   
        
  L2 − L2 + i2 + j2  
 
 = 1 2        
2j            
 
 
= 
i      
 
A2 
 
L1 
    
 
j     
 
Data: Deployment of anchor nodes  
Result: Successfully deploying anchor nodes and exchanging trilateration 
information 
 
Start initialization; Deploy the anchor 
nodes;  
Set the initial coordinates (lat & long) for 
(10) each anchor node;  
Cluster anchor nodes into a set of three or 
 
From Eq. (5) and Eq. (10) we get the values of A1 
and A2 respectively. From that we can find out 
the value of A3 from Eq. (1), 
 
q 
A3 = ±  L
2
1 − A
2
1 − A
2
2 
 
From the above equation we can say that, A3 can 
have either positive or negative value. If any one 
circle intersect the other two circles precisely at 
one point, then A3 will get a value zero. If it 
intersects at two or more points, outside or 
inside it can get either a positive or negative 
value, respectively. 
more;  
while not at end of deployment do  
Trilaterate a group of anchor nodes to a centre 
point (or trilateration point) and save the 
location reference in M1∗;  
Individually trilaterate all the anchor nodes with 
the neighbouring group and save the location 
references in M2∗, M3∗ , etc.;  
Pass trilateration information to its immediate 
neighbours; 
 
end 
Stop deploying anchor nodes; 
(∗ M1, M2, M3, ETC., are different memory with 
different location reference) 
Algorithm 1: Setting up anchor node 
 
During deployment each node carries out the 
trilateration process with all of its neighbour-ing 
nodes and every node is authorized with two or 
more trilateration points for security reasons. 
Every node reveals the information about its 
trilateration point to its immediate or one hop 
neighbours. Care is taken that no node reveals 
the trilateration information about its 
neighbours. 
 
The algorithm for setting up the anchor nodes 
according to trilateration is given in algorithm 1: 
 
The algorithm for finding out the malicious 
anchor nodes is shown in algorithm 2: 
 
After the comparison, the anchor nodes that 
does not have the same location reference or the 
anchor node that tends to be vulnerable is 
considered to be malicious or cheating node. To 
confirm its adversary, we compare it with 
maximum likelihood expectation and Maha-
lanobis distance. 
 
Data: Location coordinate of nodes  
Result: Finding out the malicious anchor nodes Start; 
 
Trilaterate each group of anchor nodes to a centre point and 
save that location; 
 
Compare the obtained location with location 
reference (M1);  
while comparison not satisfied do  
Trilaterate all anchor nodes (individually) of the 
particular group (which does not satisfy the above 
comparison) with the neighbouring group (using 
the trilateration information obtained during 
deployment);  
Compare the obtained results with the location references 
(M2, M3, etc.); 
 
if a node is suspected to be malicious then  
Separate the mismatched anchors node location and save the 
new location in MN; 
 
end 
end  
If comparison satisfied, no cheating nodes occur; 
Stop; 
 
Algorithm 2: Finding out the malicious an-chor 
nodes 
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3. CORRELATING WITH MAHA-LANOBIS 
DISTANCE  
 
Mahalanobis distance applies posterior proba-
bility to identify the outliers. When two an-chor 
nodes in space are demarcated by two or more 
associated location coordinates, Maha-lanobis 
distance can be used to find the dis-tance 
measure between the two anchor nodes. 
Mahalanobis distance identifies the malicious 
cheating nodes by comparing the location co-
ordinates with respect to a centroid value. In 
our case the centroid value is the location co-
ordinate of the trilateration point. The Ma-
halanobis distance function to identify the dis-
tance measure between two anchor nodes are 
as follows: 
d(mahalanobis) = 
 
q 
[(xj , yj ) − (xi, yi)]
T
 ∗ C−1 ∗ [(xj , yj ) − (xi, yi)] 
 
where:  
d(mahalanobis) is the distance between two anchor 
nodes,  
(xi, yi)&(xj , yj ) are the location coordinates of the two 
anchor nodes, 
C is the sample covariance matrix. 
 
The variance-covariance matrix C is con-
structed in order to gauge Mahalanobis dis-
tance, 
C = 
1 
(x, y)
T
 (x, y) 
 
(n − 1) 
  
where:  
(x, y) is the matrix containing the location 
coordinates, 
n is the number of nodes. 
 
In the instance of multiple location references 
the variance-covariance C will become as fol-
lows: 
 
σ2 (xi, yi) ρ12σ1(xi, yi)σ2(xj , yj ) 
 
 
1 
σ2
2(xj , yj ) 
 
ρ12σ1(xi, yi)σ2(xj , yj ) 
  
where: 
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tween the multiple location references. 
 
The value of C−1 is computed as follows: 
" 
 σ12 (xi,yi)  −ρ12 σ1 (xi,yi)σ2 (xj ,yj ) 
# 
 
 |C|  |C| 
 
−ρ12σ1 (xi,yi)σ2 (xj ,yj )  σ22 (xj ,yj ) 
 
  |C|   |C|   
 
 
where:  
|C| is the variance-covariance matrix’s deter-
minant and is equal to σ1
2σ2
2(1 − ρ212) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Transforming Location Coordinates 
to Matrix Representation (a). 
σ2 &σ2  are the variances of the multiple loca-  
 
1 2 
Figure 8. Transforming Location Coordinates  tion references,  
to Matrix Representation (b). 
 
ρ12σ1(xi, yi)σ2(xj , yj )  is  the  covariance  be- 
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The transformation of the location 
coordinates to matrix form is shown in Figure 
7 and Figure 8. The Mahalanobis distance 
function can be modified to identify the 
distances from multiple location coordinates 
to a centroid, as follows: d(δ) =  
q 
[(xi, yi) − (xi, yi)]
T ∗ C−1 ∗ [(xi, yi) − (xc, yc)] 
 
for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n where:  
d(δ) is the distance between centroid and ith 
anchor node,  
(xi, yi) is the location coordinate of the i
th 
anchor node, 
(xi, yi) is the location coordinate of the cen-
troid or trilateration point. 
 
The new distances obtained using 
Mahalanobis distance, are compared using 
posterior proba-bility; leading to the 
confirmation of the anchor nodes adversity. 
 
4. ASSOCIATING WITH MAXIMUM 
LIKELIHOOD EXPECTATION  
 
One of the most broadly and commonly used 
classification technique is maximum 
likelihood expectation / classification. It has a 
good ac-ceptable result and is extensively 
employed and demanding algorithm. 
 
The localization error obtained during the above 
mentioned algorithm is discussed in our next 
section. And the obtained results are compared 
with maximum likelihood expecta-tion method. 
In wireless sensor networks, all the sensor data 
or the sensed data are sent to a central server 
or aggregation point. In our scheme, the central 
server is made available with the location 
references of all the nodes in the network and 
MLE method is carried out with the location 
references available in the ag-gregation point or 
the central server. 
 
Maximum likelihood Expectation is a tech-nique 
that is used in statistics to find the max-imum 
probable value from previously obtained results. 
The results obtained from maximum likelihood 
expectation can be used as the para- 
 
 
metric values for further experiments or simu-
lations. 
 
4.1. Probability density function  
Probability density function (pdf) sorts out the 
required area for the random variable to oc-
cur. Consider a random sample (x1, x2, ..., 
xn) from an unknown population has data 
vector x = (x1, x2, ..., xn). The probability 
density function f (x|w) is 
f (x = (x1, x2, ..., xn)|w) =  
f1(x1|w) ∗ f2(x2|w) ∗ ... ∗ fn(xn|w) 
 
where: x is a random sample, w is the param-
eter value.  
Consider a scenario where n (number of tri-
als) = 10, w = 0.4 and x = (0, 1, ..., 10), then 
the probability density function will be f (x|n = 
10, w = 0.4) =  
10!
 (0.4)x(0.6)(10−x) 
x!(10 − x!) 
 
The parametric values have a large number 
of successive probabilities. 
 
4.2. Likelihood Function  
The trilateration groups are denoted as ϕk, k 
= 1, 2, 3, ..., M where M is the number of 
trilateration groups. To determine the group, 
to which an anchor node with the current lo-
cation z belongs, the conditional probabilities  
p(ϕk|z), k = 1, 2, 3, ..., M  
play a crucial role. The probability p(ϕk|z) 
states whether ϕk is the correct trilateration 
group of the anchor node with the give 
location z. We can categorize the anchor 
nodes, if we know the complete set of p(ϕk|z) 
from decision rule  
z ∈ ϕk if p(ϕk |z) > p(ϕn|z) for all n =6 k  (11) 
 
This explains that the anchor node with loca-
tion z is the member of group ϕk if p(ϕk |z) is 
the largest probability of the set.  
The desired p(ϕk|z) from the above equation 
and the available p(z|ϕk ) from the projected 
training data, are correlated by Bayes theorem  
p(ϕk|z) = 
p(z|ϕk)p(ϕk) 
(12)  
p(z)    
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where:  
p(ϕk ) is the probability that anchor nodes 
from group ϕk can move its location,  
p(z) is the probability of finalizing an anchor 
node with location reference z. 
 
M 
X 
p(z) = p(z|ϕk)p(ϕk)  
k=1 
 
Replacing equation (12) in (11), reduces the 
decision rule to  
z ∈ ϕk if p(z|ϕk) > p(z|ϕn) for all n =6 k  (13) 
 
In equation (13), p(z) has been eliminated as 
a shared factor, since we don’t know whether 
it correct location or false location. As p(z|ϕk) 
can be obtained from the training data, and it 
is plausible that the priors p(ϕk) can be esti-
mated.  
In order to prove mathematically, we define 
the discriminant function ̺k(z) =  
ln p(z|ϕk)p(ϕk ) = ln p(z|ϕk) + ln p(ϕk)   (14) 
 
In order to get a decision rule by substituting 
Eq. (14) with Eq. (13), we need a monotonic 
function i.e., natural logarithm. We give the 
decision rule as  
z ∈ ϕk if ̺k(z) > ̺j (z) for all j 6= k (15) 
 
To further proceed with maximum likelihood 
estimation, a certain probability model is cho-
sen for the trilateration group function p(z|ϕk). 
In our scheme, we used Gaussian 
distribution which is as follows: p(z|ϕk) =  
(2π)−S/2|Ci|
−1/2e 
−1 
(z−x¯i)T Ci−1(z−x¯i) (16) 
 
2   
where: x¯ is the mean position of the anchor 
node among the trilateration group ϕk, Ci is 
the covariance matrix of the trilateration 
group ϕk , S is the N dimensional space. 
To obtain the categorization function,  sub- 
stitute Eq.  (16) with (14) to get ̺k(z)  =  
−
2
1 S ln 2π − 12 ln |Ci| − 
1
2 (z − x¯i)
T Ci
− 1(z − 
x¯i) + ln p(ϕk) Simplifying we get, ̺k(z) = ln p(ϕk) −  
1
2 ln |Ci| − 
1
2 (z − x¯i)
T
 Ci
−1
(z − x¯i) Removing 
the prior probability gives us the trilateration  
group membership of the anchor node, 
 
̺k(z) = − 
1
2 ln |Ci| − (z − x¯i)
T
 Ci
−1
(z − x¯i) (17) 
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Eq. (17) is used to identify whether the 
anchor node belongs to current trilateration 
group and reducing the localization error. If 
the anchor node does not belong to the 
group it is consid-ered deceitful. 
 
5. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
 
Our simulation was carried out in 600m x 600m 
two dimensional environment. Deploy-ing the 
anchor node accurately is very impor-tant. First 
three anchor nodes were placed ran-domly and 
the trilateration point is found for the same. An 
anchor node is placed on the trilateration point 
attained. Any one of the first three nodes is 
selected and it acts as the trilateration point of 
the newer nodes that are going to be deployed. 
The above process is repeated until the final 
node is deployed. We deployed around 117 
nodes (around 1 node for every 5m x 5m), 
spread randomly using the above method. 
Figure 9 shows the deployment of the anchor 
nodes in our scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Deployment of Anchor Nodes. 
 
 
5.1. Experiment using trilateration tech-nique  
 
Few anchor nodes were compromised (mak-
ing it transmit false information regarding its 
current location) randomly and the malicious 
anchor nodes were found out using trilatera-
tion technique. The localization error tran- 
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spired while localizing the malicious anchor 
nodes from random samples, were noted down. 
Each simulation was carried out for 50 times 
and the mean error was considered. Figure 10 
shows the mean error in location discovery and 
Figure 11 shows the time taken to locate the 
malicious anchor nodes during simulation. 
 
 
error in location discovery. Figure 12 shows the 
mean error in locating malicious anchor nodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Mean Localization Error While us-
ing Trilateration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Average Time for Simulation. 
 
 
5.2. Comparing with Mahalanobis dis-tance 
 
The central server or aggregation point has a 
list of initial location references of the anchor 
nodes. The false location of the malicious an-
chor nodes obtained, were compared with the 
results obtained from Mahalanobis distance. 
Comparing the results obtained, reduced the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Mean Error after Comparing with 
Mahalanobis Distance. 
 
5.3. Comparing with Maximum Likeli-hood 
Expectation   
Maximum likelihood function has a list of ini-tial 
location references of the anchor nodes. The 
false location of the malicious anchor nodes 
obtained, were compared with the re-sults 
obtained from maximum likelihood func-tion. 
Comparing the results obtained, reduced the 
error in location discovery. Figure 13 shows the 
mean error in locating malicious anchor nodes 
while using maximum likelihood expec-tation. 
Figure 14 shows the comparison of the three 
results, trilateration, trilateration with 
Mahalanobis Distance and trilateration with 
MLE. Finally the information about the mali-
cious anchor node is conveyed to all the nodes 
other than the infected nodes, and the routing 
table is updated by confiscating the malicious 
anchor node. 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE EVENTS  
 
Malicious anchor nodes will constantly hin-der 
genuine and appropriate localization. Our scheme 
was carried out using fixed sensor nodes and the 
attack has a permanent consequence in the 
sensor node. Reducing the localization er-ror and 
endorsing the malicious anchor node were 
implemented successfully in this paper. 
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Figure 13. Mean Error after Comparing with Maximum Likelihood Function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Result Comparison. 
 
We have proposed a novel scheme using maxi-
mum likelihood and trilateration technique to 
identify malicious anchor nodes. The error can be 
increased if hindrance, interferences, and at-
tenuation caused by signal fading, and noise are 
additional. Our scheme can also be mod-elled to 
overcome such disturbances by using some 
statistical distributions like Rayleigh or Rician 
distributions [34]. Our algorithm per-formed 
consistently for different topologies. 
 
Our scheme can be extended for mobile sensor 
node with an intermittent attack type. Our 
framework can be extended to acoustic and 
ultra-wideband (UWB) technology. Using en-ergy 
efficiency as a benchmark is quite chal-lenging. 
Our algorithm was implemented in 2-D plane and 
can be extended to 3-D plane 
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also. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
For smart environments, security plays a very 
essential part. In this paper, we discussed about 
localizing malicious anchor nodes in a secured 
manner, using trilateration technique and 
comparing the results obtained with max-imum 
likelihood expectation and Mahalanobis distance. 
By both the techniques way we were able to 
reduce the error attained during local-ization. 
However, maximum likelihood expec-tation 
outperformed Mahalanobis distance in 
perceiving cheating beacon nodes. By using 
maximum likelihood expectation and Maha-
lanobis distance we can obtain consistent and 
proficient results. Our results show that as the 
malicious anchor nodes increases, the simula-
tion time and error obtained during location 
discovery slightly increases. The accuracy ob-
tained in our work can be used as assistance in 
some wireless applications. Some imminent 
events for further research have been discussed. 
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